

10 December 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DULLES

Attached is Planning Board's memorandum to the Special Committee to review US POLICY ON CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS (Secretary of State, Defense, and AEC Chairman), which summarizes agreed and opposing views as follow:

1. State and Defense Working Group Members agree that: no disarmament plan should be based on good faith on USSR's part; and continued support of the UN Plan involves unacceptable risk to US and will be construed as hypocritical by our major allies.

OPPOSING VIEWS OF: STATE

2. Test to learn if USSR might feel elimination or reduction of nuclear war threat to be in its interests.
3. State phased plan entails less risk to US security that continuation of current armaments trends.
4. Proceed by safeguarded phases to a system which might become more reliable and extensive.
5. State plan will reduce likelihood of total nuclear war as compared to reliance on current armament trends.
6. Phase reduction of atomic stockpiles so that US will always have more atomic material than USSR.
7. Stoppage in production of atomic material and stockpile reduction would be better than continuing current trends.
8. Agreement and execution of control and reduction of conventional weapons will not be a pre-condition to agreement and execution of control and reduction of nuclear weapons.
9. According to Defense report, any plan is infeasible.

DEFENSE

Test will place US under pressure to accept disarmament plan inimical to US security.

Risk to survival is less under dependence on retaliatory capacity than under any disarmament plan.

Have a comprehensive and enforceable system before any disarmament action is taken.

There is less likelihood of total nuclear war in reliance on current armament trends than on any disarmament plan.


Unrealistic to presume that Soviets will agree to any plan with US in atomic superiority.

Production stoppage and stockpile reduction will put US at a greater disadvantage than continuation of current trends.

Agreement on control and reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons must be first step.

State plan is technically inadequate.

FNP



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In [redacted] absence [redacted]  
office advises that the problem  
has been discussed with DDI; and

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[redacted] general comment was  
that a reasonable approach lay  
between the two extremes here  
presented. Try must be made  
but safeguards must be insured.

Sub.

**EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON**

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December 10, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: U.S. Policy on Control of Armaments

REFERENCES: A. NSC 112 and 112/1  
B. NSC Action Nos. 899, 909, and 1256

The enclosed memorandum from General Cutler to the Special Committee constituted under NSC Action No. 899 and the NSC Planning Board's statement of principal issues between the State Member and the Defense Member of the Special Committee's Working Group are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its consideration of the subject at its meeting on January 6, 1955.

*S. Everett Gleason*

S. EVERETT GLEASON  
Acting Executive Secretary

cc: The Secretary of the Treasury  
The Director, Bureau of the Budget  
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff  
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission  
The Director of Central Intelligence

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON

C O P Y

December 10, 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: U. S. Policy on Control of Armaments

1. This memorandum is addressed to you as members of a Special Committee constituted under NSC Action No. 899 (September 9, 1953) to review the policy contained in NSC 112 (July 6, 1951).

2. The Planning Board has received from the members of the Special Committee's Working Group:

a. A statement by the Defense Member, with four annexes (August 27, 1954).

b. A synopsis of the Defense Member's position (November 24, 1954).

c. A statement by the State Member (November 29, 1954).

d. A statement by the AEC Member (December 2, 1954). Each member of the Working Group made clear that these statements constituted only working drafts which had not received agency clearance.

3. The Planning Board has discussed these papers. The Board has not attempted to prepare a summary description or an evaluation of the plans proposed by the State and Defense Members. Instead, the Board has sought to identify the principal issues underlying the two plans and to express succinctly (in the attachment) the positions asserted by the State Member and the Defense Member on these principal issues.

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The Board feels that this brief indication of opposing views should assist the Special Committee in trying to resolve the principal issues before consideration by the National Security Council on January 6, 1955.

ROBERT CUTLER  
Special Assistant to the President  
Chairman, NSC Planning Board

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U.S. POLICY ON CONTROL OF ARMAMENTS:

AGREEMENTS AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE POSITIONS  
ASSERTED BY STATE AND DEFENSE WORKING GROUP  
MEMBERS ON PRINCIPAL ISSUES

Agreements

1. State and Defense agree that:

- a. No disarmament plan should be based on good faith on the part of the USSR.
- b. Continued support of the UN Plan involves unacceptable risk to the U.S. and will be construed as hypocritical by our major allies.

Differences

- 2. a. State: The possibility should be tested that the USSR might consider the elimination or reduction of the threat of nuclear warfare to be in its interests.
- b. Defense: There is no possibility of USSR agreement to a disarmament plan acceptable to U.S. security, failing the abandonment of Soviet ambitions. An effort to test this possibility through step by step negotiation and partial implementation will place the U.S. under pressure to accept a disarmament plan inimical to U.S. security.
- 3. a. State: The State phased plan would entail less risk to U.S. security than the continuation of current armaments trends.
- b. Defense: The risk to U.S. survival is less under the U.S. continuing to depend on its safeguarded retaliatory capacity to deter Soviet nuclear attack than under any disarmament plan, unless there is abandonment of Soviet ambitions or in the absence of world government.

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4. a. State: Proceed by safeguarded phases, each beneficial to U.S. security, to a system which might become progressively more reliable and extensive (learning by experience and with the ability to discontinue if necessary, without having impaired U.S. security).

b. Defense: As an essential pre-condition, have a comprehensive and enforceable system before any disarmament action is taken.

5. a. State: The State plan will reduce the likelihood of total nuclear war as compared to ~~reliance~~ on ~~current~~ armament trends.

b. Defense: There is less likelihood of total nuclear war in reliance on current armament trends than in reliance on any feasible disarmament plan, unless there is abandonment of Soviet ambitions or in the absence of world government.

6. a. State: It is feasible to phase proportionate reduction of atomic stockpiles so that the U.S. will always have more atomic material than the USSR, even allowing for some Soviet ~~secretion~~ and diversion.

b. Defense: It is unrealistic to presume that the Soviets will agree to any plan which continues the U.S. in a position of atomic superiority.

7. a. State: Stoppage in production of atomic material and a partial reduction in atomic stockpiles under State's phased plan would be better, or no worse, than a continuation of current armament trends.

b. Defense: Stoppage in production of atomic material and initiation of partial reduction in atomic stockpiles will put the U.S. at a greater disadvantage in conventional power relations than a continuation of current armament trends and, among other things, will lead to pressure from allies and uncommitted countries for further reductions unacceptable to U.S. security.

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8. a. State: Agreement and execution of control and reduction of conventional weapons will be aggressively sought, but will not be a pre-condition to agreement and execution of control and reduction of nuclear weapons in the initial phases.

b. Defense: Agreement on control and reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons must be the first step; subsequently, the execution of control and reduction of both types of weapons would proceed in concurrent stages to be defined in the plan.

9. a. Defense: The State plan is technically inadequate to accomplish the purposes for which designed.

b. State: According to the Defense report, any plan, including the State and Defense plans, is technically infeasible.

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